Manny to Dodgers

With Manny to the Dodgers, I'd say the Marlins cannot win. They didn't get a catcher, which they desperately need, since they are playing a 3d stringer. And they didn't get a big bat.

The Dodgers are now loaded in the outfield with Manny, Kemp and Ethier. Juan Pierre and Andruw Jones shouldn't, but will, receive more plate appearances this year. I bet the Dodgers let those stones drag them down simply because they are paying big money. It would be smarter to recognize they were stupid signings, and play the real talents.

The Dodgers are obviously counting on Casey Blake at 3b, at least this year. He's 32 years old, so he is not the future. I suppose Blake DeWitt showed them enough at 3b for them to find LaRoche expendable. A little surprising, but at least they made their move.

Boston is a weaker team at the moment. Bay is not as good a hitter as Manny, which means he won't adapt to the AL pitching as fast as Manny will adapt to the NL pitching. But, he will have the Green Monster, and he's a better defensive player.

Pittsburgh? What difference does it make? Andy LaRoche is a serious prospect and gets reunited with his brother Adam. Not much else to say.

Mo Manny

As I've written before, I'm a Manny Ramirez supporter. He's such an incredible hitter.

I lost a little respect this week, though. Boston is in a tight playoff race, and I think Manny is tanking it. Not only is it a bad time for him to be denigrating the team, he seems to be punishing his teammates at the same time.

On the Marlins telecast last night they interviewed Dan Uggla about trades generally, and how they blend in with the team. Uggla said that you never know whether a guy will blend in and be a good teammate or not. Some very talented players join teams, and while their stats may contribute, they can actually bring down the team as a whole.

Uggla was not asked about Manny, but if the Marlins' clubhouse is so tight, what's gonna happen with Manny in there. Florida is a bunch of underachievers who probably play better because of a good clubhouse. When Josh Johnson came out of the game last night, Uggla went over to him, patted him on the back and said "Don't worry. We've got your back." He then went up and hit a two-run homer, which was the margin of victory.

In the dugout after the homer, Hermida must have hugged Uggla three times. And it's Hermida who is likely out the door if Manny joins the team.

Griffey to White Sox

Ken Griffey, Jr. is headed to the White Sox for Danny Richar and Nick Masset.

Right now the Sox outfield is Dye, Swisher and Quentin. That’s pretty good. Konerko at first and Thome at DH. Where does Junior play? If you put him in the OF, Swisher has to play first or sit. If you DH him, Thome has to play first or sit. If Swisher or Thome play first, Konerko's out of the picture.

The rumor is that Konerko will sit (thanks to Wes for the contribution). He is having an attrocious year. It would be a bad year at the plate for a really good defensive shortstop, much less at first base.

So I guess that means Griffey in center, Swisher at 1b and a Thome/Konerko platoon at DH. You don't want Thome at 1b if you can help it.

Another reminder of how fast fortunes can change (like Morgan Ensberg last year). Konerko has been very productive for the Sox over the years.

The White Sox really gave up nothing to get Griffey. Richar, who is the odd man out now that Alexei Ramirez is in the picture, and Nick Massett, who is already 26 and is doing journeyman work in the bullpen.

Why would the Reds want a second baseman?

Teixeira Trade

As ESPN has reported 250 times in the last two hours, the Braves traded Mark Teixeira to the Angels for Casey Kotchman and pitching "prospect" Stephen Marek.

What I'm wondering is this: what's it like to be Casey Kotchman right now? You are the starting first baseman on the best team in baseball. The playoffs are a foregone conclusion. The only question is how far.

Now you are going to a team that is on the downswing after a long long climb. The Braves, in one weekend, lost their three best players (Chipper, Hudson and Teixeira). The best hitter on the team is Brian McCann. And then who? Kelly Johnson? Jeff Francoeur? The best pitcher? Jair Jurrjens?

And the Braves are not clicking on all cylinders in the minors, at least on the hitting side, so no help is on the way. The Braves appear to have a strong set of pitchers in the minors, but Stephen Marek wouldn't seem to add much. He was not rated as one of the Top 11 prospects in the Angels' system by Baseball Prospectus' Kevin Goldstein.

In 2007, BP's book said: "He consistently delivers heat in the low-90s (topping out at 95), and supplements it with a nice curve and change, though his delivery needs work. He has work to do--he won`t be able to overpower people as easily in Double-A--but he`s among the organization`s best pitching prospects."

Wow, that's not bad. Problem is, he didn't make BP's 2008 book at all, after a lackluster performance in high A ball. The BP Web site predicts him as having a 10% chance of being a regular in the rotation in 2008, decreasing thereafter. In other words, he was expected to peak this year as a fringe starter.

Now he's already 24 years old in double A. So far he has been a game finisher for Arkansas, having started no games. Why did I call him a finisher instead of a closer? He has finished 20 games, but that's with only 3 saves. He's had 14 other relief appearances. Granted, in that role he is striking out more than a batter an inning, which is nice. Still, adding a closer to the Braves AA system isn't much of a boost, is it? Or do they think they can work some magic and make him a starter?

Kotchman goes from a real contender for the world title, to a team that is several years away from contending for a playoff spot.

Kotchman said this: "I'm not shocked. I'm overflowing with joy and thankful of the opportunity to go to Atlanta and play for Bobby Cox. I've heard a lot of great things about him."

I believe the part about playing for Bobby Cox. I don't believe for a second he is overflowing with joy.

Bad Trades

Watching the Reds-Marlins game, and researching where some of the players began their careers, revealed a couple of awful trades:

1. The Expos traded all-star Grady Sizemore, pitcher Cliff Lee (who looks like Cy Young) and Brandon Phillips of the Reds, for Bartolo Colon and Tim Drew.

Colon pitched well for Montreal in the second half. He was then traded with Jorge Nunez to the ChiSox, for Rocky Biddle, El Duque, Jeff Liefer and cash.

Okay, so that means: Sizemore + Lee + Phillips = Drew + Biddle + Liefer + El Duque + cash. Yeah, that MLB-Montreal thing worked great!

2. The Rangers traded Aaron Harang with Ryan Cullen to the A's for Randy Velarde. Uh, I'd say they didn't think much of Harang as a prospect, since at the time of the trade, Velarde was a 38-year-old utilityman.

Oakland turned Harang into Jeff Bruksch and Joe Valentine three years later. Safe to say Harang was not developing like they thought?

So at 25-years old, some genius in Cincinnati said "I think Harang is worth more than Velarde + Bruksch + Valentine." And for once, I'm not using "genius" in a facetious manner.

BTW, did you realize Harang is 6'7" and 245 pounds. Wow. To put that in perspective, Jason Taylor, the defensive end for the Miami Dolphins, goes 6'6" 255!

Santana Trade Part III

We've got four Mets prospects...three pitchers and one hitter. I don't have Baseball America's Prospects book for this year, so I'll go with Kevin Goldstein's Top 100 list.

Two of the pitchers, Humber and Mulvey, are not listed in Goldstein's Top 100. They were both in Double A last year. Neither seem likely to crack the list of Top 25 pitchers next year.

The other pitcher, Deolis Guerra, is a kid. He is at the bottom of the Top 100 list. It is conceivable he could crack the Top 25 pitchers. Let's assume he does. Under Wang's system, his expected value is 11.2 WARP over six years, and the savings over a free agent add another 8.4 WARP for six years, so that's 19.6 in expected WARP value for Guerra.

Carlos Gomez, the young center fielder, is higher on Goldstein's list. It seems likely he could crack the Top 25 hitting prospect list next year, but he does not look like he'll be projected as a Top 10 guy. That's another 31.7 in expected WARP value.

So, if Gomez and Guerra are #11-#25 prospects as hitter and pitcher, respectively, and Humber and Mulvey do not crack the Top 25, Santana has to be worth 51.3 WARP over the next six years.

BP has not released PECOTA projections for this year, but last year's remain available. BP only projected five years from 2007-2011. From the years 2008-2011, Santana was expected to generate WARP of 23.3, as follows: 7.1, 6.2, 5.0 & 5.0. For 2012, let's assume another 5.0, and for 2013, let's assume a little decline, since he'll be 34 years old. Call it 4.5.

That makes Santana worth 32.8 over the six years. That seems to give the Twins a significant edge. It does, however, assume that Gomez and Guerra end up as top 25 prospects. Let's say Gomez has a 50% chance of being a Top 25 prospect, and Guerra has a 25% chance. The expected WARP for those two would now be 20.75, and the Mets win the trade (subject to the additional caveat below about Humber and Mulvey).

Maybe PECOTA is off and Santana will be better. But keep in mind that in the last six years, Santana has provided 54.0 of WARP, and that's during his prime! If he performs at that same level, the Mets win the trade.

Keep in mind that the scenarios showing the Mets winning are without any data about what prospects outside the Top 25 are worth. They are worth something, even if it is a long shot. Mulvey and Humber have some expected value that we'd need to add onto the Twins side of the equation.

Long story short, if Gomez and Guerra become Top 25 prospects next year, it looks like the Twins win. If Gomez does and Guerra doesn't, it's close to break even for the Twins, subject to whatever value Mulvey and Humber have. If Guerra does and Gomez doesn't, the Twins lose.

It's not as obvious a win for the Mets as I would have thought...at least using Wang's analysis.

One other point is required, and Wang mentions it too. Despite all the math, Santana is not just a star...he's a big star. He can win the Mets a couple of championships. All of the Twins guys can contribute to a team, but they cannot carry a team. If the Twins got three minor contributors and an everyday player, or even two of each, they may add up to a star's value. However, the star brings something more than raw value to the equation. The star pushes you over the edge towards a championship.

Santana Trade Part II

Top 10 hitting prospects have an expected 6-year WARP of 23.1, while those ranked #11-#25 are at 18.0. Top 10 pitching prospects have an expected 6-year WARP of 12.9, while those ranked #11-#25 are at 11.2.

The most innovative thought in Wang's analysis is to calculate how much salary a team saves by keeping a prospect, over what the team would spend to get the same WARP from a free agent. That salary savings can be used to then purchase or develop another player.

For example, a Top 10 hitting prospect can be expected to produce a 6-year WARP of 23.1 at a cost of approximately $2.0 million per year. The same free agent would cost about $8.8 million per year. The savings of $6.8 million could be used to purchase a free agent who would provide another 18.28 in WARP. Therefore the prospect is worth at least 42 WARP, and any trade in which that prospect is shipped to another team requires that the "selling" team get at least 42 WARP in return over the next 6 years to break even. (Again, these are figures from my spreadsheet using what I interpret Wang's methodology to be. They differ slightly from those reported in his tables.)

It works out something like this:

1. A top 10 hitting prospect is odds-on to be a contributor, and the money saved by keeping him and getting a free agent nets you another contributor. If you trade the prospect, you trade two contributors. You have to get a star in return.

2. An 11-25 hitting prospect is odds-on to be a minor contributor, and the money saved by keeping him and getting a free agent nets you another minor contributor. If you trade the prospect, you trade two minor contributors. You have to get an everyday player in return.

3. A top 10 pitching prospect is odds-on to be a minor contributor, and the money saved by keeping him and getting a free agent nets you a fairly useless pitcher. If you trade the prospect, you trade a minor contributor and a bust. You have to get a contributor in return.

4. An 11-25 pitching prospect is odds-on to be a bust, and the money saved by keeping him and getting a free agent nets you another fairly useless pitcher. If you trade the prospect, you trade two busts. You still have to get a contributor in return.


That's the concept I want to apply to the Santana deal.

(continued in Part III)

Santana Trade Part I

I have yet to see a publication, journalist or fan who thinks the Twins "won" the Santana trade. Today I read an article in the most recent issue of The Baseball Research Journal, written by Victor Wang that makes me wonder if the consensus is correct.

Wang looked at Top 10 prospects listed in Baseball America in the late 90s, and calculated how many of them were busts, how many were contributors, how many were everyday players and how many were stars. He used BP's WARP system to make those determinations, and I won't rehash them here. He did the same for prospects ranked 11-25 (and who never cracked the Top 10).

He then calculated what those prospects are expected to be worth, and what they are expected to cost, over a 6 year period. The first three years they make major league minimum. The next three years they make $0.64 million, $0.83 million and $1.29 million per WARP. The expected figures are a straight "expected value" calculation, multiplying the historical probabilities from his Baseball America analysis, times the salary and WARP figures he found.

He also calculated how much a free agent would cost assuming the same expected WARP, using $1.69 million per WARP in year one, and then increasing the cost by 10.87% each year for "inflation." (This last point is not entirely clear in the article. He mentions 10.87% escalation, but then seems to use $1.69 million in his calculation).

The article includes tables that are totally non-intuitive, and unfortunately, his peer reviewers did not flag this for the author. He provides a text description of the tables that is scarcely more helpful. I had to read the article four times, and then do my own spreadsheet, despite the fact the calculations are pretty straightforward once you have Wang's data about the prospects.

(In the rest of this topic, I'll use the figures from my spreadsheet, based on what I interpret Wang's methodology to be. They differ slightly from those reported in his tables.)

Many of the conclusions support what we already know. Pitching prospects are a significantly more risky crop than hitting prospects. Top pitching prospects have a 54-60% chance of being a bust and only a 3-4% chance of being stars. Top hitting prospects have a 20-33% chance of being a bust, and 14%-16% chance of being stars.

(continued in Part II)

Tigers 2008 Batting Lineup

In 2007, the Tigers most often used this lineup:

Granderson (8)
Polanco (4)
Sheffield (dh)
Ordonez (9)
Guillen (6)
Rodriguez (2)
Casey (3)
Monroe (7)
Inge (5)

The Tigers scored 5.47 runs per game last year with that lineup, with due allowance for shuffling in the 7-9 spots and the Sheffield injury. That was good for second in the AL.

The new Tigers lineup will look something like this, having eliminated the weak 7-9 hitters:

Granderson (8)
Renteria (6)
Cabrera (5)
Ordonez (9)
Sheffield (dh)
Guillen (3)
Polanco (4)
Rodriguez (2)
Jones (7)

I plugged in these two lineups into the lineup optimizer at Baseball Musings.com. The '07 lineup is predicted at 5.56 rpg, which is pretty close to the actual 5.47 figure, particularly when you take into account that that particular lineup was used in only 25 of 162 games.

The projected '08 lineup? 6.168 rpg, an increase far in excess of a half run a game.

It translates to nearly 1,000 runs scored. What does that mean when translated to wins? If the pitching staff gives up exactly the same number of runs as last year (797), the Tigers are predicted to win 98 games, a full nine game improvement. That would have won the AL Central this year. In fact, it would have given them the best record in baseball!

Analyzing the Angels-White Sox Trade

Sox get Orlando Cabrera (SS)
Angels get Jon Garland (SP)

First the players.

Cabrera

Cabrera finished in my own Gold Glove standings at short. Interestingly, I gave the Gold Glove to Juan Uribe, the man who Cabrera will replace. Of course, Cabrera brings a lot more to the plate than Uribe, since Uribe is essentially a replacement-level hitter. There's no question this is an upgrade at SS for the Sox.

Did the Angels get equivalent value? Let's not forget that Cabrera is 33 years old...not exactly his prime. Cabrera's best year was 2001 with Montreal at age 26, and his second best year was 2003. Last year was his third best year, but the pattern for shortstops normally does not include a lot of upside at age 33. On the other hand, Cabrera improved every year he was with the Angels and exceeded his projections by about 25%.

Garland

You might argue that the Angels don't need the pitching. Lackey is a perennial Cy Young contender, and Escobar has been terrific the last two years. Toss in Jared Weaver and you've got a pretty good top 3. Joe Saunders was promising, and if Ervin Santana can get back on track, the Angles are in good shape. Don't forget, though, Escobar will be 32 next year, so he's no sure bet. Then again, he's had his two best years in 06-07.

Garland is a pretty good hedge against Escobar's downside risk, as Garland is only 28. Garland basically wore out his welcome in Chicago this year, with some atrocious starts. Looking at his final numbers, though, he wasn't too shabby overall. Garland was not as valuable as Escobar, but nearly as valuable as Cabera, and with less mileage on him.

Take away his three really bad starts (game scores below 10, all of which were among the worst all time), and he posted an ERA of 3.31 (not 4.23), gave up only 14 homers in 200 IP (his lowest rate ever) and and a WHIP of 1.20 (not 1.33). Good numbers. In fact, Garland was every bit as good in 07 as 06. It's hard to know if he can return to his 2005 form, but as is, he's a good #3.

This trade certainly benefits both teams in terms of getting a good player and filling a need. The outcome hinges, then, on whether the Angels can adequately fill the SS spot and whether the White Sox can fill Garland's spot in the rotation.

Replacing Cabrera

The Angels have three choices: Maicer Izturis, Erick Aybar and Brandon Wood. Izturis has played a lot of third, where he really can't hold up against other AL third basemen because of his bat and only average defense. He's a good value as a utility man, but isn't the answer to Cabrera.

Aybar is a prospect, more dazzling with the glove than the bat, and only 23 years old. He split time in 2006 between AAA and the Angels, and wasn't ready for prime time. In '07, he got fewer than 200 at bats, and did not impress. He was shaky at SS, and bad at the plate, showing neither patience nor power. He was basically replacement level, which is quite a setback for his 23rd year.

Brandon Wood doesn't seem ready either. Wood is one of the most highly touted players in the minors...drafted 9th overall in 2003. His power numbers in 2005 and 2006 led many to conclude he was destined for 3b. Then he only got 33 ABs for the Angels this year, and didn't hit a lick. He was pretty strong at Triple A, with 23 homers in 430+ ABs.

Wood will compete for the starting job in training camp. I'm guessing he won't quite be read, but will get the starting nod anyway, with Izturis filling in. Aybar looks like he's on the outside looking in. By mid-year, I suspect Wood will have the job for big league job for good.

Replacing Garland

Chicago better start from the ground up. Contreras and Vazquez are getting old, leaving only Buehrle with experience and a track record. Danks had a rough rookie year, but always transitions slowly to a new level. His morale could not have been good with this team. He could be a solid pitcher. Who is left? Gavin Floyd? Charlie Haeger, the knuckleballer? I'm trying to come up with another name. Jack Egbert (he was great in Birmingham, but is he ready to jump from Double A)?

I can see trading Garland and rebuilding, but don't you need young arms in the system to rebuild? I guess the White Sox will be buying -- not a good strategy at the prices charged by average pitchers these days. Other than Egbert, I don't see it.

Verdict

Any downside for the Angels will be remedied by mid-year. The White Sox will benefit at SS, but not enough to make up for the horrid pitching. And down the road, Garland will certainly be more valuable and successful in LA than Cabrera in Chicago.

Good for Morgan Ensberg

Two homers in his Padre debut. Take that, Houston!

More Genius from ESPN

Watching the Mets/Brewers contest, the ESPN team was talking about the brilliance of John Schuerholz in making deals. No denying that as a general principle.

Steve Phillips cited the Teixeira deal, saying Schuerholz was able to land the biggest catch "without even giving up a major leaguer." Then, realizing the error, he corrected by saying "except Saltalamacchia, but he's a new major leaguer. Otherwise, just prospects."

Just prospects? Unless you are the Yankees or Red Sox, prospects are the heart of the organization. It is debatable whether Salty and the prospects for Teixeira is a good deal or not for the Braves, but even if it is, Teixeira was not stolen for mere prospects. Salty will probably be one of the 3 best catchers in the AL by next year, and that's nothing to sneeze at. If one of the five prospects becomes an average major leaguer, Texas will come out ahead, considering Teixeira's contract.

There's plenty of analysis of this trade elsewhere, and I won't rehash the arguments. But it is idiotic to act as though giving up prospects is like getting a superstar for free.

The scariest thing is that Steve Phillips was a general manager! Perhaps that's why he's broadcasting now.

Morgan Ensberg

With the Astros maintaining an illusion of contending for a playoff spot, and acquiring Ty Wigginton, they have designated Morgan Ensberg for assignment.

It reminds me how quickly fortunes change for professional athletes. Two years ago Ensberg was an All-Star, and finished 4th(!) in the MVP voting. Last year there was a dip in production, and most people think he had a bad year. But he was still a useful player. His .235 batting average in 2006 looks bad, but he was still managing nearly a .400 OBP even with that horrible average. The average third baseman in the National League in 2006 had an OPS of 826. Ensberg had an 859.

Less than a year later, and he has no major league job. The average third baseman this year has an OPS of 787, and Ensberg is at only 707, which isn't particularly good at any position.

His fielding has also declined. In 2005 and 2006, he was very good defensively, according to BP's FRAA and FRAR. This year, he's not only below average, he is below replacement level. The wheels have come off.

How? He got hurt last year. He started 2006 on fire, with 17 HR in April and May, with lots of walks. Then he hurt his shoulder. After that, he was basically useless at the plate.

BP 2007 says he is not a favorite of Phil Garner, and predicted he'd be traded. But, BP also thought he'd put up an 850 OPS with 20+ HR. I guess without those numbers, the Astros have no way to move him to another team. The Astros GM indicated that he didn't think Triple A made sense for Ensberg, so I suspect that if he isn't traded in 10 days, he's going to be out of baseball for awhile.

Can anyone use him? You wouldn't think so, if these are indicative of his ability, particularly since he is 31 years old. But check out Minnesota's production at third base. Punto/Rodriguez/Buscher have combined for a VORP (Value Over Replacement Player) of -27.2. That's horrible. It is very difficult to be that bad at a position. Almost anyone would be better.

Ensberg might not improve that, but I hardly see how they could do worse. I guess it depends on how expensive he is. Since homers fly out in Minnesota's ballpark, and Ensberg has a little pop, he might be useful. Minnesota's DHs are also below water in VORP, so he could fill in there too.

St. Louis Cardinals Trades (Best)

Here are the best trades according to Win Shares, in order of worst to best (from the Cards' perspective). A quick note on one trade that cannot yet be completely evaluated: 2002- Rolen and Nickle (Cards) for Polanco, Timlin and Smith (Phils). Currently the Cards lead this by about 15 Win Shares (you probably thought it would be bigger, but Polanco is darn good, though now traded to Detroit). Going forward, it is Rolen vs. Ugueth Urbina and Ramon Martinez.




The winning trades, from worst to best:

Cards get:	Ozzie Smith, Mura, Olmsted
Cards lost:	Templeton, Lezcano, Luis DeLeon
Other Team:	San Diego
Year:	1981
Net WS:	17.5 (6 wins)
#Cards’ players:	3
#Other team’s players	13
Comments:	I would have guessed the Cards would win this one big time, but besides Templeton, Lezcano was great for SD, and Lezcano eventually turned into Lance McCullers, who turned into Jack Clark. Also, at the end of his career Templeton was traded to the Mets and SD got a couple of good years from Tim Teufel in return.

Cards get:	Jack Clark
Cards lost:	Green, LaPoint, Uribe, Gary Rajsich
Other Team:	San Francisco
Year:	1985
Net WS:	54.9 (approx. 18 wins)
#Cards’ players:	1
#Other team’s players	12
Comments:	This one is odd. Uribe actually trumps Clark here, since Clark left St. Louis as a free agent. Plus, the Giants eventually ended up with a couple of good seasons each from Terry Kennedy and Rick Reuschel at the end of their careers. Trouble is, the Giants had to give up Jeff Robinson, Eric King and, importantly, Matt Nokes as throw-ins.

Cards get:	Frisch, Ring
Cards lost:	Hornsby
Other Team:	New York (N)
Year:	1926
Net WS:	60.6 (approx. 20 wins)
#Cards’ players:	6
#Other team’s players	6
Comments:	Hornsby had a great season for the Giants and left, but the Giants got Shanty Hogan in return, and he contributed 75 WS over 5 seasons. Frisch, of course, was outstanding.

Cards get:	Bill White, Jablonski
Cards lost:	Sam Jones, Choate
Other Team:	San Francisco
Year:	1959
Net WS:	72.1 (approx. 24 wins)
#Cards’ players:	26
#Other team’s players	2
Comments:	Giants got a couple of good seasons from Jones, but turned it into nothing. Cards did well with Bill White, but then made a bunch of nickel and dime moves that cost them more in throw-ins than it gained them

Cards get:	McGwire
Cards lost:	Stein, Mathews, Ludwick
Other Team:	Oakland
Year:	1997
Net WS:	77.5 (approx. 26 wins)
#Cards’ players:	1 (just McGwire)
#Other team’s players	7
Comments:	Too bad McGwire retired, because the net WS in this trade would have just kept growing.

Cards get:	Cepeda
Cards lost:	Sadecki
Other Team:	San Francisco
Year:	1966
Net WS:	156 (approx. 52 wins)
#Cards’ players:	8
#Other team’s players	5
Comments:	You think Cepeda was good? The Cards ended up with Joe Torre too! Meanwhile, neither Sadecki nor his trade progeny produced much for the Giants.

Cards get:	Flood, Joe Taylor
Cards lost:	Schmidt, Kutyna,Wieand
Other Team:	Cincinnati
Year:	1957
Net WS:	211.6 (approx. 71 wins)
#Cards’ players:	2
#Other team’s players	3
Comments:	Flood was fantastic. Everyone else was horrible.

Cards get:	Hendrick
Cards lost:	Rasmussen
Other Team:	San Diego
Year:	1978
Net WS:	230.6 (approx. 77 wins)
#Cards’ players:	4
#Other team’s players	1
Comments:	Seven good seasons for Hendrick, and then he turned into John Tudor. Rasmussen never produced and SD never got anything for him.

Cards get:	McGee
Cards lost:	Sykes
Other Team:	New York (A)
Year:	1981
Net WS:	239.6 (approx. 80 wins)
#Cards’ players:	5
#Other team’s players	1
Comments:	Sykes never pitched again. McGee was the center of the great Cards teams in the 1980s, then he turned into Felix Jose (who was pretty good), and Jose turned into Greg Jefferies (a fantastic hitter).

Cards get:	Del Greco, Littlefield
Cards lost:	Virdon
Other Team:	Pittsburgh
Year:	1956
Net WS:	246.8 (approx. 82 wins)
#Cards’ players:	58
#Other team’s players	1
Comments:	This is probably the most shocking of the analyses. Virdon was good for the Pirates, but not a star. Then he retired. Meanwhile the Cards managed to get 58 players in this lineage. Del Greco and Littlefield did absolutely nothing, and along the way the Cards had throw-ins like Jackie Brandt and Red Schoendienst. So how did the Cards come out so far ahead? Two other trades on this list are connected. Littlefield (and others) became Ray Katt, who became Sam Jones, who became Bill White! More importantly, Littlefield (and others) became Ray Katt, who became Hobie Landrith, who became Ernie Broglio, who became Lou Brock. What a segue to the top trade!

Cards get:	Lou Brock, Spring, Toth
Cards lost:	Broglio, Shantz, Clemens
Other Team:	Chicago
Year:	1964
Net WS:	310.8 (approx. 104 wins)
#Cards’ players:	3
#Other team’s players	4
Comments:	This one is self-explanatory.

St. Louis Cardinals Trades (Worst)

Here are the worst trades according to Win Shares, in order of worst to best (from the Cards' perspective). The trades by WS, in order of worst to best (from the Cards' perspective). The categories are self-explanatory, except "# Cards' players" is the number of players eventually connected to the transaction on the Cards side -- with all subsequent trades factored in -- and "# Other teams' players" reflects the same thing for the team with which the Cards made the original trade. You will see that the Cards liked to trade...a lot! And especially when they made a bad deal originally. They frequently grabbed a so-so guy for a year, then either released him, sold him or traded him for a couple more so-so guys.

Cards get:	Rick Wise
Cards lost:	Steve Carlton
Other Team:	Philadelphia (N)
Year:	1972
Net WS:	-278.7 (approx 93 wins)
#Cards’ players:	16
#Other team’s players	1 (just Carlton
Comments:	The Cards got a little out of Wise, and some more out of Reggie Smith, but that was offset by the losses of Bernie Carbo and Mike Vail as throw-ins for subsequent trades. In the end, the Cards got no WS and the Phils got 278.

Cards get:	Dutch Henry, Ogden
Cards lost:	Derringer, Sparky Adams, Stout
Other Team:	Cincinnati
Net WS:	-205.8 (approx 69 wins)
Year:	1933
#Cards’ players:	7
#Other team’s players	7
Comments:	Durocher wasn't too bad, but nobody else contributed. Derringer and Sparky Adams were strong for Cincinnati, and Stout was traded for Billy Myers, who contributed more for Cincy than Durocher did for the Cards.

Cards get:	Allen, Ownbey
Cards lost:	Keith Hernandez
Other Team:	New York (N)
Year:	1983
Net WS:	-125.2 (approx. 42 wins)
#Cards’ players:	2
#Other team’s players	1
Comments:	Allen contributed little and then was sold outright to the Yanks. Ownbey added nothing. You already know about Hernandez.

Cards get:	Granger
Cards lost:	Hisle, Cumberland
Other Team:	Minnesota
Year:	1972
Net WS:	-87.6 (approx. 29 wins)
#Cards’ players:	3
#Other team’s players	2
Comments:	Granger did nothing, and was traded for other players who did nothing. Hisle was good, and this trade would have been worse for the Cards if Hisle had stayed with Minnesota. Instead, he bolted for Milwaukee via free agency.

Cards get:	Lohrman, O’Dea, McCarthy
Cards lost:	Mize
Other Team:	New York (N)
Year:	1941
Net WS:	-72.9 (approx. 24 wins)
#Cards’ players:	4
#Other team’s players	1 (just Mize)
Comments:	Mize was very good for the Giants, but the Yanks purchased him 4 years later. The Cards got a little bit out of O’Dea. This trade is hard to evaluate, because the Cards got $50,000, which bought a couple of decent players back then. But, the Giants probably got a tidy sum when the Yanks bought Mize.

Cards get:	Sizemore, Stinson
Cards lost:	Dick Allen
Other Team:	Los Angeles
Year:	1970
Net WS:	-64.6 (approx. 22 wins)
#Cards’ players:	46
#Other team’s players	3
Comments:	Allen had one good year for LA, but he was traded for Tommy John, who gave the Dodgers a number of solid years. The family tree on the Cards side is a mess: forty-six players in the lineage of this trade. Sizemore was good, but the Cards kept trading. Ultimately, Jack Clark and Lonnie Smith were in the picture and contributed WS. Even Ozzie Smith (with 275 WS) is connected to this trade. So how do the Cards lose? They kept trading, and kept throwing in new players. Unfortunately, the Cards’ throw-in players included Ted Simmons, Terry Kennedy, Garry Templeton, Aurelio Lopez and Jose Uribe (all of whom earned at least 77 WS before ending their careers).

Cards get:	McLean, Jack Taylor
Cards lost:	Three Finger Brown, O’Neill
Other Team:	Chicago (N)
Year:	1903
Net WS:	-6.2 (approx. 2 wins)
#Cards’ players:	7
#Other team’s players	3
Comments:	I thought the Cards would do worse in this trade, but Taylor contributed, then was traded for Beebe who contributed, and Beebe was traded for Rebel Oakes who contributed and Miller Huggins, who really contributed.

St. Louis Cardinals Trades

In the latest issue of The National Pastime, Lyle Spatz describes candidates for the worst and best trades in St. Louis Cardinals history. I decided to apply Win Shares to the trades, as one way of measuring which deals were best and which were worst. Obviously, the Win Shares for the players involved in the trade were part of the equation. However, I also included Win Shares for any players the "deal players" were subsequently dealt for. Also, when those deal players were subsequently dealt, there were other players sometimes thrown in who went with them. I treated those throw-ins, who otherwise would not have had a connection to the deal (some of whom were quite good), as "opportunity costs," so their future Win Shares were subtracted from the team that traded them away because those were Win Shares the trading team would have had if not for the throw in.




As a brief example, Rick Wise came to the Cards when they traded Steve Carlton to Philadelphia. St. Louis gets Wise's WS in a Cards uniform. Philadelphia gets Carlton's WS in a Phils uniform. Wise was then traded to Boston for Reggie Smith and Ken Tatum. St. Louis gets Smith and Tatum's WS in a Cards uniform. But in that deal Bernie Carbo was sent from the Cards to Boston. Carbo is the "throw in" player otherwise unconnected to the original trade. Since the Cards lost the future value of his services, Carbo's WS after the trade are subtracted from the Cards side of the ledger, because they lost his future services. In some cases, this goes on and on. One note, though: the opportunity cost of trading away players actually connected with the deal -- like Wise, or Reggie Smith after he was traded to the Dodgers -- was not factored in, both for reasons of complexity and because there seemed to be a danger of double-counting...my brain got a little twisted up trying to figure it out.




It goes without saying that other things factor into trades. Clubhouse personality, the availability of someone in the minors to replace the traded player, etc. I'm not saying the method is perfect...it's just the way I chose to do it because I think it is interesting.




I'll break this into two more posts. One for the worst trades, and one for the best (from the Cards perspective).