Saturday, April 05, 2008

Huston Street

I've never paid much attention to Huston Street before. Now that he's on my fantasy team, I'm watching him more closely. Unfortunately, in three outings, he has surrendered three home runs.

I've been messing around with MLB Gameday's pFX pitch data. I can't claim I understand it to the degree that some do, but I wanted to investigate the difference between the gopher pitches Street has thrown, and his normal pitches. These are admittedly very small sample sizes, so take it with a grain of salt.

Because the first game was in Japan, complete pFX data is unavailable for the first game. So we'll start with the second game, on April 2, against Boston. Varitek hit a home run off of a change up, at least as classified by the pFX system (which may or may not be accurate with respect to pitch identification). He threw 20 pitches that day...7 were changeups, averaging 84.75 mph at the release point. pFX shows his fastball at only 88.43, however, so there isn't a whole lot of difference. Two of Street's change ups were around 80 mph.

It's possible these pitches were misclassified. If not, his change isn't much of a change.

I graphed the difference between the change up he threw to Varitek on the homer, and the 6 other change ups he threw that game. First, the chart, then some explanation:The top point on the blue line represents the average release point for the 6 non-HR change ups he threw, and the bottom point on the blue line represents the average location of the change ups as they reached the front of home plate. The top and bottom of the strike zone are represented by the purple lines...and they are averages of the strike zones of the batters Street faced in Boston that day. The top point on the yellow line represents the release point on the change up to Varitek, and the bottom point is approximately the height at which Varitek made contact.

What is clear from the graphic is that Street's release point was further left on the home run ball, and instead of a falling motion (induced mostly by gravity), it crossed the plate slightly outside (to Varitek) and right in the middle of the average strike zone. MLB pFX reports this as an 86 mph change up. He had thrown two earlier change ups to Varitek in the at bat, averaging 80 mph...both for balls.

In the game against Cleveland last night, Hafner hit a fastball into the seats. It was the third fastball of the at bat. Street threw eight other fastballs during his appearance. The average speed at release was 89 mph, which is about the speed of the fastball he threw to Hafner.

Here's the chart for that one:

It shows that Street's release point was off to the left on the HR ball in this instance too, and the pitch ended up in Hafner's wheelhouse.

One note: the downward slopes of the lines represent only starting and ending points for the pitch. It does not indicate the pitch "broke" in that manner. The lines include the effects of gravity.

Friday, April 04, 2008

Japanese Baseball

I'm watching Hideki Kuroda pitch tonight, and the San Diego broadcast team had an interesting story about him that I thought I would repeat here.

Kuroda was worried about joining the Dodgers, because he was concerned that Russell Martin is the everyday catcher. Apparently Japanese players are of the general opinion that American catchers are "sloppy" compared to their Japanese counterparts. Kuroda joined the Dodgers after talking with the Dodger closer, Takashi Saito, who assured him that Martin knew what he was doing.

Martin wasn't the least bit concerned, saying "I'm Canadian."

(Side note: Kuroda looks solid. I don't want to speak too soon, though, since I drafted him for my fantasy team).

Wednesday, April 02, 2008

Jeff Brantley, YOU ARE NOT A CLUTCH COMMENTATOR

Jeff Brantley, the former closer for the Giants, Reds and other teams, was doing the color commentary for the Arizona-Cincinnati matchup. Reds were down 5-3 in the bottom of the ninth. Phillips singles. Dunn singles. So there are men on 1st and 2d with no outs.

Encarnacion at the plate. Brantley keeps saying he should bunt, and Dusty Baker obliges. Back to this decision in a moment. After Encarnacion displays absolutely no talent for bunting, and has a 1-2 count, Brantley says:

If he can't bunt, get him out of there. Put someone else in. HE DOESN'T HIT IN THE CLUTCH. THIS GUY IS NOT A CLUTCH HITTER!

I capitalized the last two sentences because Brantley was literally yelling, as if he were actually angry about it. The very next pitch -- approximately 2 seconds later -- Encarnacion clubbed one into the left field seats to give the Reds a 6-5 victory.

When hearing Brantley, I had two immediate thoughts: (1) lots of studies show there is no such thing as clutch ability that is repeatable from year to year and (2) what does he have against Encarnacion that would make him yell out to millions of people "This guy is not a clutch hitter"? I hope Brantley never has to interview him.

Now, let's consider whether Encarnacion should be bunting, assuming he is an average hitter (fair assumption) and average bunter (unfair assumption...he looked terrible bunting and had no sacrifices last year).

Cincinnati's win expectancy, down by 2 in the bottom of the ninth, with men on first and second, is 34.6%. If Encarnacion gets the bunt down, there will be one out and men on second and third. The win expectancy for that situation is 30.1%, so the bunt is a bad play for an average hitter/average bunter because it reduces Cincinnati's chances of winning by 5%.

Arguably Encarnacion is a slightly above average hitter, and he certainly is a below average bunter. The bunt, then is a pretty bad play, if you are actually expecting him to bunt. One caveat -- if you are merely attempting the bunt to draw the third baseman in, you may be increasing your chances of scoring if you then swing away. That's not what Dusty was trying however.

Sideline Reporters

I've complained before about the third member of the broadcast team, particularly on ESPN, where the third member either gives us (a) meaningless information, (b) information readily available from any other source or (c) a product endorsement. Normally it's just an excuse to let someone other than the play-by-play and color men talk.

Watching the Mets at the Marlins, on FSN, I saw a useful report from Craig Minervini, the "sideline" reporter for the Marlins local broadcast. In the game, Carlos Beltran hit a deep fly to right that appeared to hit just above the yellow line on the wall. It was called a home run and Beltran did his trot.

Marlins manager Freddy Gonzalez argued, the umps conferred, and they changed the call. The replay shows it hit the railing and was clearly a home run. Even though it would have been hard to see exactly where the ball hit in real time from field level, it bounced way up in the air. It only would have done that if it hit the railing. If it hit the yellow line on the padded wall, it would barely have bounced at all.

Anyway, within minutes Minervini was in right field, in the stands, asking the fans in the front row exactly where the ball was hit. A fan pointed to the spot on the railing. Another fan with a scorebook said he recorded it as an HR, and only crossed it out when the umps got it wrong. That's good and fast work.

Tuesday, February 26, 2008

Boone Factor for Jockeys


I couldn't resist calculating the Boone Factor for a jockey. The only jockey's name I know is Willie Shoemaker, and Wikipedia says he weighed 95 pounds (and only 2 1/2 pounds at birth).

His Boone Factor? 7.92. Nearly 8 beers a night!

The Boone Factor

Bret Boone was a productive player for awhile, and then he fell off a cliff and retired in a surprise announcement in Spring Training 2006. No explanation.

Yesterday he revealed that the problem was alcohol. He's clean now, and all that stuff, and trying to make a comeback. We'll see.

What struck me about the story on MLB.com was this sentence: "Boone's problems started in a more subtle matter[sic], but it got to a point where he would drink 12 to 15 beers after a game."

Twelve to 15 beers? Maybe it's just me, but that seems like a lot of beer. That's a party.

Was it a lot for Bret? According to baseballreference.com, Boone's playing weight was 180 pounds, which is about 81,647 grams (using Google's conversion feature). Fifteen beers at 12 ounces per beer, is 180 ounces, or about 5,103 grams.

So, bathroom breaks aside, Boone may have added another 6.25% to his body weight after games. He may have weighed as much as 11 pounds more leaving the bar than when he arrived. I think I know why he lost some bat speed.

The sciences always have names for their formulae, so I'm going to refer to this as the Boone Factor. The Boone Factor has many applications. For instance, how many beers would that be for, say, Tony Siragusa? Football reference.com reports his weight at 330 pounds. The exchange rate would be 27 beers.

To do your own calculations of the Boone Factor:

Step One: Multiply the player's weight (in pounds) times 453.59 to find his weight in grams

Step Two
: Multiply the figure in Step One by .0625 (or 6.25%) -- call this the Boone Intake Parameter

Step Three
: Divide the figure in Step Two by 28.35 to find the number of beer ounces imbibed

Step Four
: Divide the figure in Step Three by 12 to derive the number of beers. (Substitute for the 12 if you are calculating tall boys, cans of malt liquor, or appropriately, Boone's Farm).

Monday, February 04, 2008

Anyone Can Write A Baseball Book

Tonight at Borders I read the Introduction and first chapter of a book called "Stat One" by Craig Messmer. The book consists of a ranking of historical players, by position, with some commentary.

Basically the facts and figures associated with the players have been seen in countless other places. The alleged innovation is a new stat that the author claims best represents hitting ability, or value, or both...I'm not sure. Best I can tell, he does not actually use the new stat to rank the players, so the rankings end up being just another guy's opinion.

The new stat is this: (Net Runs + Net Runs + Complete Bases)/Plate Appearances.

Net Runs are: RBI + R - HR
Complete Bases are: Total Bases + BB + HBP + SB - CS

That's it. That's the Holy Grail stat the book considers "A New System For Rating Baseball's All-Time Greatest Players." He calls it the P/E. The "P" is for production and the "E" is for efficiency.

He does almost nothing to justify the stat. He first criticizes production stats because they are dependent on other players. He then criticizes efficiency stats because they do not translate to runs. Fair criticisms, but nothing new.

How does he solve the problem? He creates a new stat that is two-thirds dependent on other players and divides it by plate appearances to produce an efficiency stat that does not translate to actual runs produced. In other words, his stat is comprised of exactly the parts that he says don't work in existing statistical methods. Then he makes it worse by combining them all.

Sabermetricians might ask (among many other things) "Why count net runs twice?" His response? To even things out so that Complete Bases does not dominate the outcome.

P/E seems to have no mathematical or theoretical justification. It's just a guy taking a bunch of traditional stats and combining them in a way that hasn't been published before. There's a good reason a stat this simple hasn't already been published.

Add, subtract, divide. Mix and match. See how many combinations you can come up with. It doesn't have to mean anything. It will sell.

I'm thinking of (Height (inches) + Weight (pounds) + Total Bases)/(Plate Appearances - Strikeouts). Perhaps I'll publish a list of the greatest players of all time.

Sunday, February 03, 2008

Santana Trade Part III

We've got four Mets prospects...three pitchers and one hitter. I don't have Baseball America's Prospects book for this year, so I'll go with Kevin Goldstein's Top 100 list.

Two of the pitchers, Humber and Mulvey, are not listed in Goldstein's Top 100. They were both in Double A last year. Neither seem likely to crack the list of Top 25 pitchers next year.

The other pitcher, Deolis Guerra, is a kid. He is at the bottom of the Top 100 list. It is conceivable he could crack the Top 25 pitchers. Let's assume he does. Under Wang's system, his expected value is 11.2 WARP over six years, and the savings over a free agent add another 8.4 WARP for six years, so that's 19.6 in expected WARP value for Guerra.

Carlos Gomez, the young center fielder, is higher on Goldstein's list. It seems likely he could crack the Top 25 hitting prospect list next year, but he does not look like he'll be projected as a Top 10 guy. That's another 31.7 in expected WARP value.

So, if Gomez and Guerra are #11-#25 prospects as hitter and pitcher, respectively, and Humber and Mulvey do not crack the Top 25, Santana has to be worth 51.3 WARP over the next six years.

BP has not released PECOTA projections for this year, but last year's remain available. BP only projected five years from 2007-2011. From the years 2008-2011, Santana was expected to generate WARP of 23.3, as follows: 7.1, 6.2, 5.0 & 5.0. For 2012, let's assume another 5.0, and for 2013, let's assume a little decline, since he'll be 34 years old. Call it 4.5.

That makes Santana worth 32.8 over the six years. That seems to give the Twins a significant edge. It does, however, assume that Gomez and Guerra end up as top 25 prospects. Let's say Gomez has a 50% chance of being a Top 25 prospect, and Guerra has a 25% chance. The expected WARP for those two would now be 20.75, and the Mets win the trade (subject to the additional caveat below about Humber and Mulvey).

Maybe PECOTA is off and Santana will be better. But keep in mind that in the last six years, Santana has provided 54.0 of WARP, and that's during his prime! If he performs at that same level, the Mets win the trade.

Keep in mind that the scenarios showing the Mets winning are without any data about what prospects outside the Top 25 are worth. They are worth something, even if it is a long shot. Mulvey and Humber have some expected value that we'd need to add onto the Twins side of the equation.

Long story short, if Gomez and Guerra become Top 25 prospects next year, it looks like the Twins win. If Gomez does and Guerra doesn't, it's close to break even for the Twins, subject to whatever value Mulvey and Humber have. If Guerra does and Gomez doesn't, the Twins lose.

It's not as obvious a win for the Mets as I would have thought...at least using Wang's analysis.

One other point is required, and Wang mentions it too. Despite all the math, Santana is not just a star...he's a big star. He can win the Mets a couple of championships. All of the Twins guys can contribute to a team, but they cannot carry a team. If the Twins got three minor contributors and an everyday player, or even two of each, they may add up to a star's value. However, the star brings something more than raw value to the equation. The star pushes you over the edge towards a championship.

Santana Trade Part II

Top 10 hitting prospects have an expected 6-year WARP of 23.1, while those ranked #11-#25 are at 18.0. Top 10 pitching prospects have an expected 6-year WARP of 12.9, while those ranked #11-#25 are at 11.2.

The most innovative thought in Wang's analysis is to calculate how much salary a team saves by keeping a prospect, over what the team would spend to get the same WARP from a free agent. That salary savings can be used to then purchase or develop another player.

For example, a Top 10 hitting prospect can be expected to produce a 6-year WARP of 23.1 at a cost of approximately $2.0 million per year. The same free agent would cost about $8.8 million per year. The savings of $6.8 million could be used to purchase a free agent who would provide another 18.28 in WARP. Therefore the prospect is worth at least 42 WARP, and any trade in which that prospect is shipped to another team requires that the "selling" team get at least 42 WARP in return over the next 6 years to break even. (Again, these are figures from my spreadsheet using what I interpret Wang's methodology to be. They differ slightly from those reported in his tables.)

It works out something like this:

1. A top 10 hitting prospect is odds-on to be a contributor, and the money saved by keeping him and getting a free agent nets you another contributor. If you trade the prospect, you trade two contributors. You have to get a star in return.

2. An 11-25 hitting prospect is odds-on to be a minor contributor, and the money saved by keeping him and getting a free agent nets you another minor contributor. If you trade the prospect, you trade two minor contributors. You have to get an everyday player in return.

3. A top 10 pitching prospect is odds-on to be a minor contributor, and the money saved by keeping him and getting a free agent nets you a fairly useless pitcher. If you trade the prospect, you trade a minor contributor and a bust. You have to get a contributor in return.

4. An 11-25 pitching prospect is odds-on to be a bust, and the money saved by keeping him and getting a free agent nets you another fairly useless pitcher. If you trade the prospect, you trade two busts. You still have to get a contributor in return.


That's the concept I want to apply to the Santana deal.

(continued in Part III)

Santana Trade Part I

I have yet to see a publication, journalist or fan who thinks the Twins "won" the Santana trade. Today I read an article in the most recent issue of The Baseball Research Journal, written by Victor Wang that makes me wonder if the consensus is correct.

Wang looked at Top 10 prospects listed in Baseball America in the late 90s, and calculated how many of them were busts, how many were contributors, how many were everyday players and how many were stars. He used BP's WARP system to make those determinations, and I won't rehash them here. He did the same for prospects ranked 11-25 (and who never cracked the Top 10).

He then calculated what those prospects are expected to be worth, and what they are expected to cost, over a 6 year period. The first three years they make major league minimum. The next three years they make $0.64 million, $0.83 million and $1.29 million per WARP. The expected figures are a straight "expected value" calculation, multiplying the historical probabilities from his Baseball America analysis, times the salary and WARP figures he found.

He also calculated how much a free agent would cost assuming the same expected WARP, using $1.69 million per WARP in year one, and then increasing the cost by 10.87% each year for "inflation." (This last point is not entirely clear in the article. He mentions 10.87% escalation, but then seems to use $1.69 million in his calculation).

The article includes tables that are totally non-intuitive, and unfortunately, his peer reviewers did not flag this for the author. He provides a text description of the tables that is scarcely more helpful. I had to read the article four times, and then do my own spreadsheet, despite the fact the calculations are pretty straightforward once you have Wang's data about the prospects.

(In the rest of this topic, I'll use the figures from my spreadsheet, based on what I interpret Wang's methodology to be. They differ slightly from those reported in his tables.)

Many of the conclusions support what we already know. Pitching prospects are a significantly more risky crop than hitting prospects. Top pitching prospects have a 54-60% chance of being a bust and only a 3-4% chance of being stars. Top hitting prospects have a 20-33% chance of being a bust, and 14%-16% chance of being stars.

(continued in Part II)

Thursday, December 13, 2007

MLB and Selig Worse Than I Thought

Shortly after my previous post, I flipped over to MLB.com, where they have neatly packaged in a separate link a list of all the players included in the Mitchell report.

Don't bother reading the report. MLB.com is reporting what you really want to know.

Selig, Mitchell and the Media

It's hard to understand exactly why Selig commissioned the Mitchell report. It doesn't, all by itself, "clean up" the game. It also does not produce much new information about whether baseball players (as a group) are using performance enhancing substances. I knew it. You knew it. And Bud Selig knew it.

Still, did McGwire and Bonds hit all those home runs because they bulked up, or because they stopped swinging at balls out of the strike zone?

I think Selig needed the report so he can put pressure on the union. Selig, by himself, can't do that. However, if he gets a report from a respected statesman, who holds a press conference, the media can jack it up to the Nth degree and the public can finally confirm their worst fears about doping and the baseball record books.

Now we have a 400 page report, available for download on MLB.com, where we can all see the proof of what's been happening. In case you don't download it yourself, don't worry...this is made for media stuff. They'll be all over it for weeks...interpreting, and probably misinterpreting.

It's nothing more than a media play engineered by Selig to make the union move on a testing policy. Why else would Mitchell name the players? In his press conference, he said he didn't think the players should be prosecuted for past conduct, unless Selig found a particular situation to be egregious. So why not just tell Selig and Fehr the names on the sly, and leave it out of the report? The new names are not integral to understanding the history of the problem, the investigation or the recommendations.

I guarantee you that 9 out of 10 journalists began their review of the report by hunting for player names. How many started by looking at the recommendations section? The names should draw attention away from the fact Selig and the owners did not push hard enough for substance controls before they did.

In his press conference, Mitchell said he hoped everyone would focus on the recommendations more than the player names. The best way to ensure that was to leave the players names out of the document.

The real downside is that I can no longer remain hopeful that some of the Royals will begin using performance enhancing substances.

Tuesday, December 04, 2007

Tigers 2008 Batting Lineup

In 2007, the Tigers most often used this lineup:

Granderson (8)
Polanco (4)
Sheffield (dh)
Ordonez (9)
Guillen (6)
Rodriguez (2)
Casey (3)
Monroe (7)
Inge (5)

The Tigers scored 5.47 runs per game last year with that lineup, with due allowance for shuffling in the 7-9 spots and the Sheffield injury. That was good for second in the AL.

The new Tigers lineup will look something like this, having eliminated the weak 7-9 hitters:

Granderson (8)
Renteria (6)
Cabrera (5)
Ordonez (9)
Sheffield (dh)
Guillen (3)
Polanco (4)
Rodriguez (2)
Jones (7)

I plugged in these two lineups into the lineup optimizer at Baseball Musings.com. The '07 lineup is predicted at 5.56 rpg, which is pretty close to the actual 5.47 figure, particularly when you take into account that that particular lineup was used in only 25 of 162 games.

The projected '08 lineup? 6.168 rpg, an increase far in excess of a half run a game.

It translates to nearly 1,000 runs scored. What does that mean when translated to wins? If the pitching staff gives up exactly the same number of runs as last year (797), the Tigers are predicted to win 98 games, a full nine game improvement. That would have won the AL Central this year. In fact, it would have given them the best record in baseball!

Monday, December 03, 2007

Marvin Miller and the Hall of Fame

For once I agree with something Donald Fehr said:

"It was very disappointing to learn this morning that, once again, Marvin Miller was not elected to the Hall of Fame. Over the entire scope of the last half of the 20th century, no other individual had as much influence on the game of baseball as did Marvin Miller."

I'm not crazy about putting non-players in the Hall of Fame, but since that's already been established, I think Miller ought to be in. (Anyone who cares deeply about baseball should read Miller's book "A Whole Different Ballgame" but copies are scarce.)

It would be somewhat strange, however, to elect both Bowie Kuhn and Marvin Miller on the same ballot, since they were at each other's throats. You'll notice that if you read Miller's book, or Kuhn's for that matter. But Kuhn has already died before getting the glory. In fact, everyone elected today, other than Dick Williams, has already died.

The aging Miller ought to be elected while he can enjoy the moment.

Sunday, December 02, 2007

Ode to the Yankees and Red Sox

Thou pinstripes breed contempt,
Thou foster-child of Beelzebub and Succubus:
Elysian history attests to power,
But a false tale made sweet by time
For the legend is haunted by thy payroll.
Deification via the dollar?
What god are ye? What grace have ye?
Mere mortals are thou, by George.
Though winning is the goal, you grieve
Your farm, and must pluck the fruit of smaller trees.

North, the patriots claim long-suffering sacrifice
To what green altar? What monster?
Paling to the house that Ruth hath built.
Bogged in thou fens, lusting for respect,
It hath returned, on the wings of legal tender.
Care not the Southies, the Bluebloods,
Who be desolate at their cores. Wicked,
Until glory is restoreth for decades-long pain.
Reward they that spend? That bid the most?
Thou shalt return to woe, lest you robbeth a Twin.

Tuesday, November 20, 2007

Girardi's Coaching Staff

Joe Girardi is a good guy, but he doesn't exactly have a lot of managerial experience. Sure he won the manager of the year, and he managed to win 78 games with an overachieving Marlins team. Still, that's only 78 games -- about 20 games below expectations in New York.

Granted, Girardi has a lot more talent to work with now. Is it his kind of talent? What I mean is, Girardi squeezed everything out of a Marlins team with an average age under 26. His experience is primarily with motivating young players. The oldest position player on the team with more than 100 at bats was Joe Borchard at 30, and he didn't even have 150 ABs. Next in line? Backup outfielder Alfredo Amezaga at age 28.

Last year the Yankees' average age was nearly 31. Cano and Cabrera are young. All the other position players are at least 30. Not only does Girardi not have a lot of experience generally, his meager experience was with a completely different kind of team in a completely different kind of market. Is the theory that the Yankees are getting old, and they want Girardi around for the young players?

I'm not knocking the hiring of Girardi, but I expected an experienced coaching staff to surround him. Here's who he has instead:

1st Base Coach: Tony Pena -- has managerial experience (if you count the Royals), and is the incumbent. So I guess this is where the experience is for Girardi. Question: What is a catcher doing coaching runners at first base? He stole 80 bases in 18 seasons (and was caught 63 times). I think Pena makes a better bench coach. Wonder if he can still throw from his knees.

3rd Base Coach: Bobby Meacham -- coached for Girardi in Florida, and is a Yankee, having spent all of his 6 seasons with New York. He was a very good baserunner and an average infielder, so he's not such a bad choice. I might swap out Pena and Meacham, though. Meacham would be helpful for steals. Pena, as a former manager, might be more suited to the dignified third base spot (or the aforementioned bench coach).

Hitting Coach: Kevin Long -- another incumbent who seems to be competent, since the Yankees hitters are not too shabby. I'm not convinced A-Rod, Jeter, Giambi, Matsui and Posada need a hitting coach at this point, much less one who never played in the majors. Where's the credibility? Maybe Mattingly was really coaching the hitters.

Pitching Coach: Dave Eiland -- I don't know a lot about his coaching experience, but he wasn't much of a pitcher. He started 70 games in the majors -- basically a little more than two seasons' worth as a 5th or spot starter. His ERA was basically about 25% worse than the league for his career. Of course there are lots of pitching coaches without distinguished playing records, but they don't coach the Yankees and work for an inexperienced manager. Let's face it, Girardi is the real pitching coach here. Eiland pitched 373 innings. Girardi caught pitchers for about 10,000 innings.

Bullpen Coach: Mike Harkey -- a failed prospect from the Cubs system but coached for Girardi in Florida. Harkey had lots of potential as a starting pitcher, but could never stay healthy. He pitched for 8 years and had a grand total of 27 relief appearances. What's he doing coaching a bullpen? (I can hear Harry Caray's voice slurring Mike Harkey's name even as I type this).

Bench Coach: Rob Thomson -- First of all, why do teams need a bench coach? I understood it when a grizzled vet like Don Zimmer with 60 years of baseball experience was whispering in the manager's ear. But Rob Thomson? He didn't even play in the majors. Is this the guy who is going to coach when Girardi gets thrown out of games? When I first saw this I was hoping it was former Giant second baseman Robby Thompson, but alas...

I might be wrong -- sorta hope I am -- but I don't think this coaching team is going to last long.

That's Not Wright!

Rollins won the NL MVP, with favorite Matt Holliday and Prince Fielder trailing.

Where, pray tell, were the two best players in the National League: David Wright and Albert Pujols.

If someone further down the list had to win it, I guess I can accept that it is Rollins. He's an exciting player and good for the game. I still think his teammate Utley had a better year, even with a missing month.

Monday, November 19, 2007

Chris Berman

Why does Chris Berman wish us all a very happy Thanksgiving? Does he think I care whether he wishes me a nice Thanksgiving? Have I been waiting all year just to get his best wishes?

National TV anchors are so full of themselves.

I hope Chris Berman has a very happy Thanksgiving too. Looks like he has a head start.

Analyzing the Angels-White Sox Trade

Sox get Orlando Cabrera (SS)
Angels get Jon Garland (SP)

First the players.

Cabrera

Cabrera finished in my own Gold Glove standings at short. Interestingly, I gave the Gold Glove to Juan Uribe, the man who Cabrera will replace. Of course, Cabrera brings a lot more to the plate than Uribe, since Uribe is essentially a replacement-level hitter. There's no question this is an upgrade at SS for the Sox.

Did the Angels get equivalent value? Let's not forget that Cabrera is 33 years old...not exactly his prime. Cabrera's best year was 2001 with Montreal at age 26, and his second best year was 2003. Last year was his third best year, but the pattern for shortstops normally does not include a lot of upside at age 33. On the other hand, Cabrera improved every year he was with the Angels and exceeded his projections by about 25%.

Garland

You might argue that the Angels don't need the pitching. Lackey is a perennial Cy Young contender, and Escobar has been terrific the last two years. Toss in Jared Weaver and you've got a pretty good top 3. Joe Saunders was promising, and if Ervin Santana can get back on track, the Angles are in good shape. Don't forget, though, Escobar will be 32 next year, so he's no sure bet. Then again, he's had his two best years in 06-07.

Garland is a pretty good hedge against Escobar's downside risk, as Garland is only 28. Garland basically wore out his welcome in Chicago this year, with some atrocious starts. Looking at his final numbers, though, he wasn't too shabby overall. Garland was not as valuable as Escobar, but nearly as valuable as Cabera, and with less mileage on him.

Take away his three really bad starts (game scores below 10, all of which were among the worst all time), and he posted an ERA of 3.31 (not 4.23), gave up only 14 homers in 200 IP (his lowest rate ever) and and a WHIP of 1.20 (not 1.33). Good numbers. In fact, Garland was every bit as good in 07 as 06. It's hard to know if he can return to his 2005 form, but as is, he's a good #3.

This trade certainly benefits both teams in terms of getting a good player and filling a need. The outcome hinges, then, on whether the Angels can adequately fill the SS spot and whether the White Sox can fill Garland's spot in the rotation.

Replacing Cabrera

The Angels have three choices: Maicer Izturis, Erick Aybar and Brandon Wood. Izturis has played a lot of third, where he really can't hold up against other AL third basemen because of his bat and only average defense. He's a good value as a utility man, but isn't the answer to Cabrera.

Aybar is a prospect, more dazzling with the glove than the bat, and only 23 years old. He split time in 2006 between AAA and the Angels, and wasn't ready for prime time. In '07, he got fewer than 200 at bats, and did not impress. He was shaky at SS, and bad at the plate, showing neither patience nor power. He was basically replacement level, which is quite a setback for his 23rd year.

Brandon Wood doesn't seem ready either. Wood is one of the most highly touted players in the minors...drafted 9th overall in 2003. His power numbers in 2005 and 2006 led many to conclude he was destined for 3b. Then he only got 33 ABs for the Angels this year, and didn't hit a lick. He was pretty strong at Triple A, with 23 homers in 430+ ABs.

Wood will compete for the starting job in training camp. I'm guessing he won't quite be read, but will get the starting nod anyway, with Izturis filling in. Aybar looks like he's on the outside looking in. By mid-year, I suspect Wood will have the job for big league job for good.

Replacing Garland

Chicago better start from the ground up. Contreras and Vazquez are getting old, leaving only Buehrle with experience and a track record. Danks had a rough rookie year, but always transitions slowly to a new level. His morale could not have been good with this team. He could be a solid pitcher. Who is left? Gavin Floyd? Charlie Haeger, the knuckleballer? I'm trying to come up with another name. Jack Egbert (he was great in Birmingham, but is he ready to jump from Double A)?

I can see trading Garland and rebuilding, but don't you need young arms in the system to rebuild? I guess the White Sox will be buying -- not a good strategy at the prices charged by average pitchers these days. Other than Egbert, I don't see it.

Verdict

Any downside for the Angels will be remedied by mid-year. The White Sox will benefit at SS, but not enough to make up for the horrid pitching. And down the road, Garland will certainly be more valuable and successful in LA than Cabrera in Chicago.

Wednesday, November 07, 2007

Instant Replay

Why does baseball need to change anything? It had the most successful year in its long history. People love it for its quirks, including missed calls.

As approved by the general managers, it would only apply to home run calls: fair or foul, fan interference or not, etc. If the.re was public outrage about home run calls during the year, I could see the compulsion to take action. I don't think that outrage exists.

The worst calls I saw this year were on catchers' throws to second base, and outfielders' throws to home. Those are not part of the proposed instant replay -- nor should they be.

The real danger is the slippery slope. If we start here, how many years are we away from having the computer call balls and strikes? This seems to have happened in the NFL, as the reviewable plays morph. They are now reviewing everything in the last two minutes of each half. I'm tired of the delays. I'm actually tired of having all the controversies resolved by a ref sticking his head under a hood.

In baseball will they review everything in the 8th and 9th innings? That would be ridiculous.
No one inning is more important than any other. Will it slow the game down? Will the umps run off the field into the dugout to check out the replays? If the ball is called foul, does the batter stand at home plate awaiting the decision? And if the ump says home run, does the batter then start running. Blah.

Tennis has the system down. It is a challenge system. The player simply signals to the umpire he/she wants to challenge. It takes about 10 seconds for the computer to make the line call, and the umpire has it on a screen in the umpiring chair. It is also shown to the fans. Play resumes immediately. Seamless.

I see no way to make it seamless in baseball.